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This paper applies the traditional definition of equity and efficiency in economics to 
transport pricing. It is shown how this framework can also be used to define acceptability. 
The problems and potential of this approach are illustrated by examining the effects for 
Belgium of replacing current transport pricing by marginal social cost pricing. The 
welfare effects on different income groups of this pricing reform are shown for different 
income groups using a computable general equilibrium model. We demonstrate how the 
efficiency, equity and acceptability of the reform depend not only on the change in 
transport prices but also on the way the extra tax revenues are used. We compare the 
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1. Introduction  
Any major pricing or taxation reform will be accepted only if it shows clear welfare gains 
for a sufficiently large majority of the voters. This is the essence of the economic 
approach to acceptability. A necessary condition for voters to accept the reform is a clear 
gain in utility. For some types of reform, the utility impacts on voters will be unequally 
distributed which makes the reform more difficult to accept. This is a well-known 
problem in the reform of industrial  and trade policy. 
In this paper we focus on transport pricing reforms. We deal with reforms that bring us 
from the present pricing policies – that are not very well focussed – to marginal social 
cost pricing which increases economic efficiency by addressing the different sources of 
external costs more directly. This is a policy priority for the European Commission. 
In Section 2 we cast the transport pricing reform in the traditional equity-efficiency trade-
off framework. The basis of this framework is to measure individual welfare by a utility 
function that encompasses all relevant characteristics of the individual and his economic 
environment. If one assumes furthermore the social comparability of individual utility 
levels, one can use the traditional Pareto-frontier concept to define the equity-efficiency 
trade-off in transport pricing. Efficiency corresponds with the maximisation of the sum of 
individual utilities. Equity issues are introduced by considering a weighted sum of 
utilities where the individuals with lower incomes receive a higher weight. The utility 
levels are also used to define economic acceptability. We qualify a transport reform as 
economically acceptable when it is Pareto-improving. 
In Section 3 we illustrate the concepts by comparing two policy reforms. Both reforms 
implement marginal social cost pricing for transport. Marginal social cost pricing means 
that current charges and taxes are changed so that each transport user is confronted with 
his marginal social social costs. These are equal to the sum of marginal resource costs 
and marginal external costs. The marginal external costs include the marginal external 
congestion, accident, pollution, noise and road damage costs. Infrastructure is kept fixed. 
For our case study (Belgium), the implementation of marginal social cost pricing 
generates a surplus of tax revenues that will be used in two different ways. The first 
scenario uses the net tax revenues to decrease labour taxes, while the second scenario 
recycles the extra revenue through higher social security transfers. Both transport reforms 
imply an increase in economic efficiency but differ in their equity impact and therefore in 
their acceptability. For each of the two scenarios we show the change in pricing per 
mode, in transport volumes and in individual utilities, as well as the impact on efficiency, 
equity and acceptability. 
Section 4 discusses a number of caveats and concludes. The caveats concern the 
measurement and comparability of individual utilities, the definition of acceptability and 
the aggregate level of the illustration. The main conclusion of the paper is that equity and 
acceptability cannot be discussed at the level of the transport markets: a more global 
analysis is required that includes the use of the transport tax revenue and its effects.   3
2.  The economic framework to study equity-efficiency 
and acceptability trade-offs 
The trade-off between efficiency and equity is illustrated best by means of a graphical 
analysis. To keep things simple we restrict ourselves to an economy with two groups of 
identical individuals: poor and rich individuals. First, we briefly discuss the use of 
individual utility functions and their comparability across individuals. Next, we define 
the economic possibilities of the economy, the Pareto frontier and the concept of 
economic efficiency. In a third step we define equity and acceptability. 
Individual utility and comparability across individuals  
A utility function defines the total benefit an individual can get from his consumption 
bundle, his leisure and his labour effort. The consumption bundle comprises not only his 
market transactions but also quality aspects of his consumption. These include, amongst 
other things,  travel and  living conditions (pollution, noise etc.). Whenever the individual 
prefers a combination of consumption goods, travel and living conditions, this 
combination will have a higher utility level. So a utility function is extremely useful to 
discuss the trade-off between consumption possibilities and non-market elements of 
individual well-being, such as quality of transport and environmental quality. 
Absolute utility levels are not necessary to express individual choices: any increasing 
monotonic transformation of the utility function will lead to the same individual choices. 
Absolute utility levels are also not necessary to discuss economic efficiency. We will 
however need to introduce utility functions for which we define absolute levels in order 
to introduce equity aspects easily
2: for equity one needs to compare how well off one 
individual is versus another, which requires to compare absolute levels of utility. 
From now on we assume we can measure the welfare level of an individual by using his 
utility function. The utility level of the two types of individuals that are of interest to us is 
denoted by Upoor and Urich. These utility levels measure the net benefit of all market and 
non-market goods (environment, time, etc.) in which the individual is interested. 
The utility possibility set, efficiency and equity  
Our simplified economy has given resources: a time endowment and some capital 
(human, physical) inherited from the past. When we combine these resources in a 
production process and distribute the labour effort and production over the different 
individuals we can achieve a given utility combination (Upoor, Urich), as represented in 
Figure 1. For given institutions and policy instruments one can define a utility possibility 
set. This is a set of utility pairs (Upoor, Urich) that can be achieved with the given 
resources, institutions and policy instruments. 
                                                 
2 This is a technical question on which one can consult Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Chapter 22. In fact we use 
more assumptions than necessary in order to simplify the exposition.   4
It is useful to neglect first all market imperfections (externalities, imperfect information, 
etc.) and to assume moreover that the transport sector can be organised like any other 
production sector. A competitive economy will then always lead to a point on the line 
most outbound on Figure 1. This line is called the First Best Frontier. Each point on this 
frontier is Pareto efficient: it is impossible to increase the utility level of one individual 
without decreasing the utility level of another. Without policy intervention the market 
outcome will correspond to a point (say d) where the rich are much better off than the 
poor because they own more resources or because they are more productive per hour of 
labour. If the policy maker can use individualised lump-sum taxes and transfers, he can 
achieve all points on this frontier. This is the so-called 2
nd theorem of Welfare 
Economics. By individualised lump-sum taxes and transfers one understands taxes that 
cannot be altered by the behaviour of individuals. An example is a tax on innate 
intelligence or physical force: the policy maker knows the potential productivity of the 
individual and forces him to pay a tax whatever the number of hours of work he decides 
to work. 
This is a useful but purely theoretical construct. In reality perfect individualised lump-
sum taxes do not exist because the planner has insufficient information about the innate 
capabilities of individuals so he cannot force the rich to pay a high, individualised tax. 
The planner is therefore confined to using income tax schemes and other taxes on 
transactions that distort prices and cause efficiency losses. In Figure 1 this means that 
only allocations on the Second Best Frontier are feasible. The Second Best Frontier can 
be interpreted as the efficiency-equity trade-off curve: it is only possible to increase the 
utility of the poor by using high labour taxes that discourage labour supply and create 
high welfare losses. It is important to note that we are already in a second best world even 
before we have introduced market imperfections. There is one exception: the First Best 
and Second Best Frontier will meet each other in only one point: when the income 
distribution of the perfect competition equilibrium is optimal. However, this is unlikely as 
the policy maker is in general concerned with equity. In general he prefers a more equal 
allocation e (on the Second Best Frontier) to allocation d. The policy maker wants to 
sacrifice some efficiency in order to obtain more equity. This is the basic rationale for the 
use of distortionary labour and income taxes which are used to finance the production of 
public goods and to redistribute income from the rich to the poor. High labour taxes are 
probably the major source of inefficiencies in our market economies and they find their 
justification in equity concerns. 
A convenient way of defining formally equity is to use weighted sums of utility functions 
where the weights are inversely proportional to the level of income or utility. When one 
is not concerned by equity at all (“not inequality averse”), one unit of income for a poor 
individual counts as much as one unit of income for a rich person. The other extreme is 













Introducing transport market imperfections 
We can now introduce different market imperfections and concentrate on transport 
pricing problems. We start from point c in Figure 1. This point is way below the First and 
Second Best Frontiers. The reason is that with market imperfections one cannot reach 
these two frontiers: there is a pure loss of utility possibilities that is due to institutional 
(and technological) barriers to good transport pricing. Sticking to the present imperfect 
pricing could limit the economy to the region inside the dotted curve. All one could 
achieve by distributive policies (labour taxes etc) are points on the dotted curve. It is only 
when barriers to transport pricing reform are removed that one could achieve the more 
efficient points e and d. 
It is important to see that by removing transport pricing barriers one can only achieve 
points on the Second Best Frontier because the removal of these barriers does not bring 
us the individualised lump-sum taxes necessary to reach the outbound First Best Frontier. 
Where will we end up on the Second Best Frontier? We may want to end up in point e 
rather than d. Point e still has high labour taxes but generates a more equal distribution of 
utilities than point d. 
What does moving from c to e imply in terms of policy reform? This may require that not 
all revenues are used to reduce labour taxes (one may favour some more transfers   6
targeted to the poor). Moreover, this may require departures from marginal social cost 
pricing in the transport sector. Whenever one is faced with distortions on the labour 
market, this may be: taxing certain transport goods less heavily because they are used 
predominantly by the poor and taxing commuting transport less than leisure related 
transport because this alleviates distortions on the labour market. 
Acceptability  
The acceptability of a policy reform has to do with the change in utility between point c 
and points d or e. Starting from initial point c, we define a reform from c to e as 
acceptable for individual i iff: 
 () () ii Ue Uc ≥   
Economists call a reform where at least one individual gains and no one loses a Pareto 
improvement. Such a reform is acceptable for all. The definition of acceptability we use 
here has a few caveats. First, it assumes that everyone correctly perceives the effect of the 
reform on his utility level. If people only perceive the tax increases and not that this 
allows other taxes to be decreased, a reform will never be acceptable. Perception is 
therefore a key element. 
Second, it assumes the absence of envy phenomena. Envy exists and if it is taken into 
account into the utility function, some population groups may oppose reforms in which 
they gain much less than other groups. 
Third, it assumes that every individual is only interested in ranking policy reforms and 
that this is not part of a social choice mechanism. In a social choice context, individuals 
may be interested in strategic behaviour and qualify an option as not preferred (or not 
acceptable) if they know that this helps to select a third option that they prefer even more. 
The social decision mechanisms are obviously much more complex than a simple 
comparison of utility levels. The political economy literature (see Persson and Tabellini, 
2000) studies in a much more explicit way the influence of the political institutions and 
the role of lobby groups and administrations in making a proposal go through or not. 
3.  Numerical illustration of the efficiency, equity and 
acceptability of marginal social cost pricing 
The policy reform  
We compute the welfare effects of introducing marginal social cost pricing for the road, 
rail and other public transport in Belgium. Marginal social cost pricing means that the 
current charges and taxes are changed so that each transport user faces his marginal social 
costs. These equal the sum of marginal resource costs and marginal external costs. The 
marginal external costs include marginal external congestion, accident, pollution, noise 
and wear and tear costs. Infrastructure is kept fixed. For our case study (Belgium), the 
implementation of marginal social cost pricing generates a surplus of tax revenues that   7
will be used in two different ways. In the first scenario the extra tax revenues are used to 
decrease labour taxes. In the second scenario they are recycled through higher social 
security transfers
3. Both transport reforms imply an increase in economic efficiency but 
differ in their equity impact and therefore in their acceptability. For each of the two 
scenarios the next section presents the resulting change in pricing per mode, in transport 
volumes and in individual utilities, as well as the impact on efficiency, equity and 
acceptability. 
There are two qualifications for our choice of scenarios. First, marginal social cost 
pricing is only optimal in a first best world. Given that we are in an economy in which 
the government is confined to using distortionary taxes, this means that the scenarios we 
test are not necessarily optimal
4. Second, the implementation of marginal social cost 
pricing may require important implementation costs or may not yet be fully feasible. 
Marginal social cost pricing is however an interesting benchmark scenario, which is the 
reason why it has been chosen here. 
The model used to evaluate the utility effects of the reform 
The welfare effects of the policy reforms are evaluated by means of the Computable 
General Equilibrium model for Belgium
5. It is a static model for a small open economy, 
with a medium term time horizon. Four types of economic agents are considered: five 
consumer groups, fourteen main production sectors, the government and the foreign 
sector. Two individuals belonging to a different consumer group are assumed to differ in 
terms of their productivity, their tastes and their share in the total endowment of capital 
goods and the government transfers. Individuals belonging to the same consumer group 
are however identical in terms of their needs. 
The CGE model includes several transport commodities, summarized in Table 1. A 
distinction is made between passenger and freight transport, between various transport 
modes, between vehicle types and for some transport modes between peak and off-peak 
transport. 
                                                 
3 Various alternatives, such as infrastructure investment, a change in the supply or quality of public 
transport, etc., could be considered. The efficiency and equity effects will in general depend on the 
instrument that is chosen. 
4 For the optimal tax and investment rules in a second-best economy in the presence of externalities, see 
Mayeres and Proost (1997). 
5 For a detailed discussion of the CGE model the reader is referred to Mayeres (1999, 2000).   8
Table 1:  Transport in the CGE model for Belgium 
Passenger transport
a Freight  transport
b 





    Gasoline 
    Diesel 










    Gasoline van 
    Diesel van 









Bus, tram, metro  X    Rail  X  X 
Rail X  X 




a For all passenger transport modes a distinction is made between peak and off-peak transport 
b The split between peak and off-peak transport is made only for road transport 
Four types of externalities are taken into account: congestion, air pollution (including 
global warming), accidents and road damage externalities. Air pollution and accidents are 
assumed to have an impact on the consumers’ welfare, but not on the behavior of the 
economic agents
6. This assumption is relaxed for congestion, which does not only affect 
the consumers’ welfare negatively, but also influences their transport choices. Moreover, 
the modeling approach implies that the value of a marginal time saving is determined 
endogenously in the model. Congestion also reduces the productivity of transport inputs 
in the production sectors. 
The starting point of the exercises is the situation in Belgium in 1990, which represents 
the benchmark equilibrium. There are two exceptions however. First, we made use of the 
expenditure survey by income class of 1995. Second, we introduced cars and trucks with 
the emission characteristics of the year 2000. In 1990 most cars were much more 
polluting and this would lead to very high air pollution costs. 
A number of aspects are not considered in the CGE model. First, the location decisions of 
the households and firms are not modeled. Therefore, the equity impacts of a change in 
land use are not captured by the analysis. Secondly, the number of consumer groups 
considered is limited to five. This entails that only a general idea can be formed of the 
equity impacts. A further disaggregation of the consumer groups would generate 
additional insights. Thirdly, in modeling transport decisions, no distinction is made 
between different trip purposes. Since different trip purposes have a different relationship 
with labour supply, this will affect optimal taxation (see Parry and Bento (2001), 
Calthrop (2001), Van Dender (2001)). These issues are not considered here. Fourthly, the 
shift towards vehicle types with a higher fuel efficiency or new emission technology is 
not modeled. Nor is the choice between trucks with different road damage effects. This 
means that not all effects of the pricing reforms on the externalities are included.  
                                                 
6 In reality air pollution and accident risks also affect the consumption and production choices. Such 
feedback effects are not yet included in the model.   9
The pricing reform and its transport effects  
Table 2 gives an idea of the price reform that is necessary to implement marginal social 
cost pricing. One sees that strong price increases are needed for almost all transport 
modes, including public transport. The most pressing inefficiencies in present pricing are 
found in the peak period for diesel cars and trucks and for public transport. In Belgium 
diesel cars still have a more favourable tax treatment than gasoline cars despite their 
higher environmental damage (Mayeres and Proost (2001)). Public transport on the other 
hand is very strongly subsidised with cost recovery rates of 25% or even less. This means 
that prices are below marginal social costs in most cases and that marginal social pricing 
implies large price changes. 
Table 2   The effect of the policy reforms on transport prices 
Belgium – 1990  Benchmark  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
    MSC + lower 
labour income 
tax 
MSC + higher 
social security 
transfer 
Price passenger transport  (EURO/pkm)  percentage change w.r.t. 
benchmark 
Peak 
    Gasoline car – committed
a 
    Gasoline car – suppl.
a 
    Diesel car – committed  
    Diesel car – suppl.  
    Bus, tram, metro 





















    Gasoline car – committed 
    Gasoline car – suppl. 
    Diesel car – committed  
    Diesel car – suppl.  
    Bus, tram, metro 




















Price freight transport  (EURO/tkm)  percentage change w.r.t. 
benchmark 
Truck 
    Peak – committed 
    Peak – suppl. 
    Off-peak – committed 


















a The distinction between committed and supplementary mileage allows us to model the link between car 
ownership and car use. The CGE model assumes that owning a car implies a certain minimum mileage. 
This is reflected in the committed mileage, which is proportional to the vehicle stock. The costs of 
committed mileage include the ownership and running costs per km. The consumers can choose to drive 
more than the minimum mileage per car. This is captured in the supplementary mileage, whose cost 
includes only running costs.   10
The price changes are very similar in the two scenarios. This means that in this case the 
use of the revenues does not strongly influence the volumes of transport and the marginal 
external costs. 
Implementing marginal social cost pricing means higher transport prices and therefore 
lower overall use of passenger and freight transport. According to Table 3 the strongest 
decrease can be found for peak car transport and for bus use in the off peak. Public 
transport benefits from substitution effects and this explains the net increase of volume of 
rail freight. 
Inspecting Tables 2 and 3 it is clear that implementing marginal social cost pricing means 
a net loss of consumer surplus for almost all transport users. If one limits the assessment 
to the effect on individuals as transport users, there is no chance of ever having such a 
reform accepted. We have to take into account the benefits in terms of reduced 
externalities and revenues to make the reform interesting. 
Table 3  The effect of the policy reforms on transport demand 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Belgium - 1990  Benchmark 
MSC + lower 
labour income 
tax 
MSC + higher 
social security 
transfer 
Passenger transport  mio 
pkm/year 
percentage change w.r.t. 
benchmark 
Peak 
     car 
     bus, tram, metro 














     car 
     bus, tram, metro 













Freight transport  mio 
tkm/year 
percentage change w.r.t. 
benchmark 
Road – peak 











In order to understand the welfare effects of the reform by income class we need more 
information on the characteristics of these income classes. In Table 4, first row we see the 
share of every quintile in total expenditures. This shows clearly that the poorest quintile 
has, per individual, an average spending level that is less than one third the level of the 
highest income quintile. The richest quintiles have a disproportionate share in labour 
income as they have the highest salaries. The poorest quintile has a relatively larger share 
in government transfers. 
   11
The share in public transport is more or less equal over population groups. The higher 
income groups more intensively consume private car transport. The highest income group 
consumes in fact more private and more public transport. 
Table 4:  The share of the quintiles in total household expenditures and income 
 Quintile 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Total gross expenditures 
(incl. saving) 
of which 




















Net labour income 


















Source: Ministerie van Economische Zaken (1997) 
Table 5 gives the net welfare effect of the two reforms. It is useful to concentrate first on 
the pure efficiency point of view. This means that we have no aversion to inequality. The 
aversion to income inequality is measured by the parameter ε . With ε  = 0 we are only 
interested in the sum of utility gains. In this case the introduction of social marginal cost 
pricing comes down to a social equivalent gain
7 of 149 to 160 EURO/individual/year. 
The gain is maximal when the revenues are used to reduce labour taxes. When the tax 
revenues are used to increase social transfers, there is some loss in efficiency (149 instead 
of 160) but this can be the preferred approach when equity is also considered. 
This is exactly what we observe for ε  = 0.5. In this case an income gain of 1 EURO to 
the lowest income class is considered equivalent to 1.4 EURO given to the highest 
income class. When this system of weights is used, the recycling of tax revenues via 
social transfers is preferred to the reduction in the labour income tax. 
The magnitude of the welfare gains associated to the pricing reform appears to be rather 
large compared to the expenditure levels in the transport sector. The explanation lies in 
the gains in time and in the reduction of other externalites that are non-market goods but 
that are valued by the individuals.  
 
                                                 
7 The social equivalent gain is defined as the change in each household’s original equivalent income that 
would produce a level of social welfare equal to that obtained in the post-reform equilibrium. The social 
equivalent gain is presented for two degrees of inequality aversion, as denoted by ε. With ε equal to zero, 
only efficiency matters. We also present the social welfare change for ε equal to 0.5. This corresponds with 
a medium degree of inequality aversion. In this case the marginal social welfare weight of people belonging 
to the richest quintile is approximately 70% of those belonging to the poorest quintile.   12
Table 5:  The welfare effects of the policy reforms 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Belgium - 1990  Benchmark 
MSC + lower 
labour income 
tax 





percentage change w.r.t. 
benchmark 
      Quintile 1 
      Quintile 2 
      Quintile 3 
      Quintile 4 
















Social equivalent gain (EURO/person/year) 
       ε = 0 






To discuss acceptability we need to analyse the welfare effects by income groups. Table 
5 gives the effect on welfare of the quintiles, measured by the change in equivalent 
income with respect to the benchmark equilibrium. Not all quintiles are affected equally 
by the policy reforms. Within each scenario the differential impact on the quintiles can be 
explained, inter alia, by their share in the consumption of the transport goods, their share 
in the total social security transfers or labour income, the initial tax levels and the 
quintiles’ valuation of the reduction in the externalities. In Scenario 1 all quintiles gain, 
except quintile 3. This quintile consumes a lot of transport and does not benefit as much 
as the higher quintiles from the reduction in the labour income tax. The benefits for the 
other quintiles are spread unevenly. The highest welfare gain is observed for quintile 5. 
While consuming relatively a lot of transport, this quintile benefits most from the lower 
labour income tax and from the reduction in the externalities. 
Scenario 2 generates a more uneven distribution of welfare gains, specifically directed to 
the lowest income groups. Here the highest income group experiences a net loss. This 
quintile benefits the least from the higher social security transfers. 
Our findings show that the equity impacts and the acceptability of marginal social cost 
pricing cannot be assessed completely unless one takes into account the way in which the 
extra revenue is used. A careful design of the revenue recycling policies can significantly 
enhance the political acceptability of transport pricing reforms.   13
Conclusions and caveats  
In this paper we have applied the traditional definition of equity and efficiency in 
economics to transport pricing. We have shown how this framework can also be used to 
define acceptability. The problems and potential of this approach are illustrated by 
examining the effects for Belgium of replacing current transport pricing by marginal 
social cost pricing. The welfare effects on different income groups of this pricing reform 
are calculated for different income groups using a computable general equilibrium model. 
We demonstrate how the efficiency, equity and acceptability of the reform depend not 
only on the change in transport prices but also on the way the extra tax revenues are used.  
Our analysis is subject to a number of caveats. First, the methodology is based on the 
standard economic paradigm that needs measurability and comparability of utility 
functions to measure equity concerns. The main limitation of the numerical exercise is 
the high level of aggregation. The five income quintiles should ideally be disaggregated 
along the spatial dimension and should account for different household compositions.    14
References 
Calthrop, E. (2001), On Subsidising Auto-Commuting. ETE Discussion Paper 2001-13, 
CES, K.U.Leuven, Leuven. (www.econ.kuleuven.ac.be/ew/academic/ 
energmil/publications). 
Mas-Colell A.,M.D.Whinston, J.R.Green (1995), Micro-economic Theory. Oxford 
University Press, 1995 
Mayeres, I. (1999), The Control of Transport Externalities: A General Equilibrium 
Analysis. Ph.D. Dissertation, Faculty of Economics and Applied Economics, 
K.U.Leuven. 
Mayeres, I. (2000), The Efficiency Effects of Transport Policies in the Presence of 
Externalities and Distortionary Taxes. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 
34, 233-260. 
Mayeres, I., S. Proost, E. Quinet, D. Schwartz and C. Sessa (2001), Alternative 
Frameworks for the Integration of Marginal Costs and Transport Accounts. 
UNITE Deliverable 4. Funded by the 5
th Framework RTD Programme. ITS, 
University of Leeds. 
Mayeres, I., S. Proost (1997), Optimal Tax and Public Investment Rules for Congestion 
Type of Externalities. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 99, 261-279. 
Mayeres I., S. Proost (2001), Should Diesel Cars in Europe be Discouraged?. Regional 
Science and Urban economics 21, 453-470. 
Ministerie van Economische Zaken (1997), Huishoudbudgetonderzoek. Enquête 
gehouden van juni 1995 tot mei 1996. Ministerie van Economische Zaken, NIS, 
Brussel. 
Parry, I.W.H. and A. Bento (2001), Revenue Recycling and the Welfare Effects of Road 
Pricing. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 103, 645-671. 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000), Political Economics – Explaining Economic Policy. 
MIT press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Van Dender, K. (2001), Tranport Taxes with Multiple Trip Purposes. ETE Discussion 
Paper 2001-17, CES, K.U.Leuven. (www.econ.kuleuven.ac.be/ew/academic/ 
energmil/publications).    





The Center for Economic Studies (CES) is the research division of 
the Department of Economics of the Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven. The CES research department employs some 100 people. 
The division Energy, Transport & Environment (ETE) currently 
consists of about 15 full time researchers. The general aim of ETE 
is to apply state of the art economic theory to current policy 
issues at the Flemish, Belgian and European level. An important 
asset of ETE is its extensive portfolio of numerical partial and 
general equilibrium models for the assessment of transport, 
energy and environmental policies. 
 
  WORKING PAPER SERIES 
n° 2002-12  Mayeres, I. And Proost, S. (2002), Reforming transport pricing: an 
economist’s perspective on equity, efficiency and acceptability  
n° 2002-11  Mayeres, I. (2002), Taxes and Transport Externalities 
n° 2002-10  Franckx, L. and Kampas, A. (2002), A Note on “The Choice between 
Emission Taxes and Output Taxes under Imperfect Monitoring” 
n° 2002-09  Eyckmans, J. (2002) International Environment Agreements And  
The Case Of Global Warming 
n° 2002-08  Calthrop, E. Proost, S. (2002) Environmental Pricing in Transport  
Chapter for Handbook 4: Transport and the Environment 
n° 2002-07  De Borger, B. and Van Dender, K. (2002), Transport tax reform, 
commuting and endogenous values of time 
n° 2002-06  Franckx, L. and d’Amato, A. (2002), Multiple-task common agency with  
one fully-informed principal: implications for public policy 
n° 2002-05  Moons, E. (2002), Cost- benefit analysis of the location of new forest 
land 
n° 2002-04  Rousseau, S. and Proost, S. (2002), The Cost Effectiveness of 
Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect 
Compliance 
n° 2002-03  Calthrop, E. (2002), Evaluating on-street parking policy 
n° 2002-02  Calthrop, E., and Proost, S. (2002), Regulating on-street parking 
n° 2002-01  Franckx, L. (2002), Penalty and crime with lumpy choices: some further 
considerations 
N° 2001-26  Rousseau, S. (2001), Effluent trading to improve water quality: what do 
we know today? 
n° 2001-25  Degraeve, Z., Proost, S. and Wuyts, G. (2001), Cost-efficiency 
methodology for the selection of new car emission standards in 
Europe 
n° 2001-24  Bigano, A. (2001), Environmental Dumping, Transboundary Pollution  
And Asymmetric Information  Some Insights For The 
Environmental Regulation Of The European Electricity Market 
n° 2001-23  Mayeres, I., and Proost, S. (2001), Can we use transport accounts for 
pricing policy and distributional analysis? 
n° 2001-22  Moons, E., Loomis, J., Proost, S., Eggermont, K. and Hermy, M. (2001), 
Travel cost and time measurement in travel cost models 